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Subsidizing Firm Entry in Open Economies 
 
Entrepreneurs who decide to enter an industry are faced with different levels of effective 
entry costs in different countries. These costs are heavily influenced by economic policy. 
What is not well understood is how international trade affects the government incentive to 
impact on entry costs, and how entry subsidies can be used strategically in open economies. 
We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with two (potentially) 
asymmetric countries and heterogeneous firms where government subsidizes entry of 
domestic entrepreneurs. Under autarky the entry subsidy indirectly corrects for the monopoly 
pricing distortion. In the autarky equilibrium these subsidies trigger entry, but they eventually 
do not lead to more but to better firms in the market. In the open economy there is another, 
strategic motive for entry subsidies as the tightening of domestic market selection also affects 
exporting decisions for domestic and foreign firms. Our analysis shows that entry subsidies in 
the Nash-equilibrium are first increasing, then decreasing in the level of trade openness. This 
implies a U-shaped relationship between openness and effective entry costs. Merging cross-
country data on entry costs with international trade openness indices we empirically confirm 
this theoretical prediction. 
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1. Introduction 
An entrepreneur who decides to enter an industry must undergo a number of legal procedures 
in order to start up a firm. The complexity of this process of obtaining all necessary permits 
and complying with all other relevant official requests differs vastly across countries. In a 
seminal study, Djankov et al. (2002) have collected data on entry regulation in 85 different 
countries for the year 1999 and convert these figures into pecuniary and time costs of firm 
entry. They report that starting a business in Canada requires only two official procedures and 
works almost instantaneously, while setting up a firm in the Dominican Republic is much 
more complicated and requires some 21 different procedures and a waiting time of at least 80 
business days. At the same time, governments also often encourage firm entry by means of 
start-up grants, guaranteed loans, preferential tax treatments, or other forms of subsidies. 
Entrepreneurs are thus faced with different levels of effective entry costs in different 
countries. These costs, which are typically sunk for the entrants, are not entirely set by 
governments as they also include upfront expenses for research and development, market 
search etc., but they are heavily influenced by economic policy.  
In principle there are various reasons why governments may regulate entry. Legal barriers 
may be due to benevolent motives, such as the attempt to ensure that sellers meet some 
minimum quality standards in order to supply desirable goods to consumers, but also to the 
self-interest of bureaucrats who trade entry permits for lobbying contributions (see Djankov et 
al. 2002 for a detailed discussion). Subsidies that encourage entry are typically paid out of the 
motive to increase competition in an industry and to restrain market power of incumbent firms 
to the benefit of consumers (Bresnahan and Weiss 1991). As these subsidies are, by 
definition, only paid to new firms there is a great deal of uncertainty involved in this public 
policy. It is well known that only a small share of firms that enter an industry survives the first 
few years of operation (Geroski 1995), hence some upfront government support will go to 
failing businesses that never succeed in the market. This uncertainty is one reason why public 
subsidies in support of new firm foundation are typically regarded to be only an imperfect 
policy option to target market imperfections (Reitzes and Grawe 1999), yet one that is among 
the most widespread and frequently used instruments of industrial policy in practice 
(Santarelli and Vivarelli 2002).  
What is not well understood in the literature is how international trade affects the government 
incentive to impact on effective entry costs for domestic entrepreneurs, and how entry 
subsidies can be used strategically in open economies. These are the questions that we explore 
in this paper. We build on an extended version of the model of intra-industry trade with 
heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003), where we assume two (potentially asymmetric)   3
countries and two sectors: a monopolistically competitive manufacturing industry and a 
perfectly competitive outside sector. That model is well suited as the basis for our analysis, 
because it explicates the process of firm entry with ex-ante uncertainty in a general 
equilibrium framework. Entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector pay a sunk entry cost and 
randomly draw their productivity level. Only firms with a sufficiently high draw that exceeds 
some endogenously determined cutoff level remain in the market. Firms with too low 
productivity immediately exit. When the economy opens up to trade only the most productive 
firms self-select into export markets and gain market shares. Relatively less productive firms 
sell only domestically, and the least efficient producers are forced to exit.  
The level of sunk entry costs, which is crucial for the analysis, is purely exogenous in Melitz 
(2003) and in the subsequent vast literature on firm heterogeneity. In this paper we introduce 
a government that pays subsidies to reduce effective entry costs for domestic entrepreneurs. 
We show that under autarky a welfare-maximizing government would in fact choose a strictly 
positive entry subsidy that is financed through lump-sum taxes. Such a policy targets the 
pricing distortion due to imperfect competition in the manufacturing industry. It does so only 
imperfectly, however. If the government could directly subsidize manufacturing consumption, 
it would choose this more direct way of targeting market imperfections. Yet, unlike entry 
subsidies, we rarely observe direct consumption subsidies in practice. The observation that 
real-world policies often deviate from first-best policy schemes is quite common and usually 
seen as the result of political economy mechanisms (see, e.g., Corden 1997), which are 
beyond the scope of this paper. Hence our focus in this paper is on a highly pervasive, though 
imperfect policy instrument. Turning to the effects of the entry subsidy, we show that they 
naturally increase the mass of entrepreneurs who decide to start a business. Yet, the mass of 
surviving firms is unaffected in the autarky equilibrium and the subsidies only impacts on the 
toughness of selection, the cutoff productivity. In other words, the entry subsidy does not lead 
to more but to better firms in general equilibrium. 
In the open economy, domestic subsidies tighten domestic firm selection and thereby make 
export market entry more difficult for foreign firms. This negatively affects expected profits 
and the quality of foreign firms, ceteris paribus, because they anticipate the stiffer competition 
with more productive domestic rivals ex-ante. Due to these general equilibrium interactions, 
there is scope for governments to use entry subsidies strategically in order to grasp a 
competitive advantage in trade. This strategic use is particularly interesting, because entry 
subsidies to local entrepreneurs are mainly perceived as a domestic policy and not as a 
classical trade policy instrument (such as import tariffs or export subsidies) whose abuse is 
put under scrutiny by international organizations like the WTO. In the analysis we solve for 
the entry subsidies in the Nash-equilibrium, which turn out to depend on the level of trade   4
openness. More specifically, we find that gradual trade liberalization first leads to an increase, 
then to a decrease of entry subsidies. Put differently, our model predicts a U-shaped 
relationship between trade openness and the level of effective entry costs.  
This prediction is then briefly tested empirically by merging the entry cost data by Djankov et 
al. (2002) with international trade openness indices. This simple empirical analysis confirms 
our main theoretical result. According to our estimates most countries are actually located on 
the downward-sloping range of the U-shape. This suggests that most countries may actually 
increase their efforts to engage in strategic entry subsidization in the future, when they are 
exposed to a trend of further trade integration. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the rest of this section we review some related 
literature. Section 2 analyzes the closed economy case. In section 3 we turn to the open 
economy, and in section 4 we analyze entry subsidies for the case of two symmetrical 
(equally large and technologically advanced) countries. Section 5 deals with the case of two 
asymmetric countries. The empirical analysis is presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
1.1. Related literature 
Our paper is firstly related to the general literature on firm entry in industrial organization. 
The contribution by Hopenhayn (1992) is particularly noteworthy here, because that model 
also explicitly features ex-ante uncertainty of entrants about their productivity level in a 
general equilibrium setting. It also discusses the comparative statics of the model with respect 
to sunk entry costs, yet without analyzing endogenous government subsidies to entry. 
Furthermore, our paper is mainly differentiated from that literature because we explicitly deal 
with open economy issues and study the effects of gradual trade liberalization. 
Secondly, our paper is related to the large literature on strategic trade policy (see Brander 
1995 for a survey), which has studied government interactions in open economies. Our paper 
differs in two main respects. Firstly, while this literature has extensively studied some policy 
instruments (such as export or import subsidies, state aid, tariffs, quotas, etc.) it has remained 
largely silent on entry regulation, with the paper by Reitzes and Grawe (1999) being one 
exception. Secondly, this literature typically assumes oligopolistic market structures and does 
not focus on the general equilibrium effects of trade. In the older literature on trade with 
monopolistic competition and homogeneous firms there is also an extensive discussion on the 
under-consumption of varieties and the scope for corrective policies (see Helpman and 
Krugman 1985, Flam and Helpman 1987). Our paper differs from that literature because we 
introduce Melitz-type firm heterogeneity. This gives rise to several new insights, for example 
that entry subsidies may not mainly increase the mass but the average productivity of firms. Thirdly, a recent literature has started to analyze policy issues in the now standard 
heterogeneous firms frameworks by Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). 
Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) conduct a welfare analysis of a small open economy 
and study various policy instruments that can be used to improve the allocation. They do not 
address government subsidies to entry costs, however, and they do not analyze a strategic 
interaction of governments in the setting of a domestic policy like the present paper does. 
Baldwin and Forslid (2006) also present a welfare analysis of a one-sector Melitz-type model. 
Jorgensen and Schröder (2008) study the effects of exogenous tariffs, and Cole (2008) 
considers optimal tariffs when firms differ in fixed rather than in variable costs. In Cole 
(2008) firms can also choose to engage in FDI rather than in exporting. None of these papers 
discusses endogenous entry regulation. Chor (2009) analyzes the case where governments 
subsidize the fixed export costs for foreign firms, but he does not consider subsidies to the 
effective entry costs of domestic entrepreneurs. Though he identifies a similar pro-selective 
effect of subsidies, he does not consider a strategic policy game of governments. 
Finally, this paper is also broadly related to the literature on international tax competition. 
However, in our framework governments set taxes only in order to finance subsidies for 
domestic entrants. They do not engage in a race to attract mobile firms, which is the typical 
setup of tax competition models. In that literature, Davies and Eckel (2009), Baldwin and 
Okoubo (2009) and Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2009) have considered heterogeneous 
firms, but again none of these papers considers the strategic use of entry regulation. 
 
2. Closed economy 
We first consider the case of a single country under autarky. Labour is the only factor of 
production, and there are L  workers who supply one unit of labour each. There are two 
industries,  A and C. The homogeneous good  A is characterized by constant returns to scale 
and perfect competition. The sector   is the monopolistically competitive manufacturing 
industry consisting of a continuum of differentiated varieties. Each variety is produced by a 




Preferences for household   are defined over the homogenous commodity  h A and the set of 
differentiated varieties ( ) according to the following quasi-linear, logarithmic utility 
function with CES sub-utility: 
Ω
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⎝⎠ ∫ ,   (1) 
  5where   denotes household  ’s consumption of variety   and where  () z q
h h z 01 ρ << ,  0 β > . 
The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by  () 11 σρ ≡− 1 > . As is 
well known from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the variable   can be understood as the 

















The budget constraint of an individual is 
hh PC A y ⋅ +=, where 
h y  denotes income. From 
standard utility maximization it follows that per-capita expenditure on the manufacturing 
aggregate and the numeraire good are given by 
h PC β ⋅ =  and 
hh Ayβ = − , respectively, and 
that indirect utility is of the form  ( ) 1 Vy β ln ln P ββ = −+ −
y
 where we drop the index   
from now on as households are identical.
1 It must be ensured that 
h
β < , i.e., the preference 
for varieties relative to the outside commodity must be sufficiently small. Total demand for a 





− − =⋅ ⋅ , and total revenue for that variety is 
() ()
1




. Finally, overall manufacturing expenditure equals L β . 
 
2.2. Production and firm behaviour 
Firms in the  A-sector transform one unit of labour into one unit of output. This pins down the 
wage in the closed economy, which is equal to one. Technology in the manufacturing sector is 
such that, to produce   units of output, a firm needs  q f q ϕ = + A  units of labour. The fixed 
overhead production cost  f  is the same, but the variable labour requirements ( 1 ) ϕ  differ 
across firms. Due to the CES preferences for manufacturing varieties, each firm faces a 
residual demand curve with constant price elasticity  σ −  (regardless of ϕ ). This implies that 
all firms charge prices which are constant mark-ups over the firm-specific level of marginal 
costs. Specifically, a firm with marginal cost ( ) 1 ϕ  charges the price 










Revenue and profits of that firm are then, respectively, given by  ()
1 () rL P
σ ϕβρ ϕ
− =⋅  and 
() () rf π ϕϕ σ =− . It can be seen that a firm with higher productivity level ϕ  charges a 
lower price, sells a larger quantity and has higher revenue and profits. Furthermore, as all 
firm-specific variables differ only with respect to ϕ , the CES price index (2) can be rewritten 
in the following form (see Melitz 2003): 
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1 Note that the quasi-linear preferences eliminate income effects of demand for manufacturing varieties and 
imply constant marginal utility of income. Upon request we provide a proof that all key results of this paper also 
hold with Cobb-Douglas upper tier preferences.   () ()
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⎣⎦ ∫  ⎥ . (4) 
M  denotes the mass of manufacturing firms/varieties in the market,  () μ ϕ  describes the 
productivity distribution across these active firms (which has positive support over a subset of 
( ) 0,∞ ), and ϕ   can be understood as the average productivity level. 
 
2.3. Entry and exit 
There exists a mass of potential entrepreneurs who can enter the manufacturing industry 
subject to an effective sunk entry cost  e f  . At each point in time there are 
E M  such 
entrepreneurs. Upon entry they learn about their productivity level ϕ , which is drawn from a 
common and known distribution function  ( ) g ϕ  with support ( ) 0,∞  and cumulative density 
function  () G ϕ . After the productivity level is revealed an entrant can decide to exit 
immediately or to remain active in the market, in which case that firm earns constant per-
period profits  () π ϕ . It will exit at once if  ( ) 0 πϕ< ↔   ( ) rf ϕ σ <
*0
. Only those firms remain 
active whose productivity draw exceeds some cutoff level ϕ > . Every surviving firm may 
then be hit by a bad shock which forces it to shut down. This event occurs with probability 
0 δ >  at every point in time and is independent of ϕ  (see Melitz 2003 for a discussion of this 
assumption). In a stationary equilibrium without time discounting, on which we focus in this 
paper, the mass of entrants which make it into the market equals the mass of firms that are 
forced to shut down. Formally, 
E
in pM M δ ⋅ =⋅ , where  ( ) G 1* in p ϕ =−  is the survival 
probability. The endogenous productivity distribution among surviving firms,  () μ ϕ , is then 
the conditional (left-truncated) ex-ante distribution  () g ϕ  on the domain [* , ) ϕ ∞ .  
 
2.4. Government and entry subsidization 
The novel focus of this paper is the role of governments in influencing sunk entry costs. We 
assume that effective entry costs are  ee f fs = −   where  e f  denotes some exogenous raw cost 
capturing unavoidable irreversible investments for research and development. Governments 
can reduce the effective sunk costs for entering firms. In practise, this can partly be achieved 
by simplifying legal procedures, reducing red tape or adopting related types of deregulation. 
Such reforms may reduce bureaucratic rents (which are not the focus of this paper) but do not 
impose the need for collecting taxes. In this paper we shall focus on actual entry subsidies 
(e.g., for start-up grants) that need to be financed by the government. Specifically, we assume 
that it levies a lump-sum tax t. As gross per-capita income is equal to one by the choice of the 
numeraire, individual after-tax income is  1 yt = −  and aggregate tax revenue is tL . This 
money is spent on the non-refundable entry subsidy   that is unconditionally available to all  s
  7entrants 
E M  before productivity ϕ  is drawn, and that does not have to be paid back by the 
entrepreneurs if they succeed in the market.
2 The government budget constraint is therefore 
given by   where the mass of entrants depends on the entry subsidy  .  ( )
E s M s =⋅ tL s
 
2.5. Equilibrium in the closed economy and parameterization 
To derive the equilibrium within the manufacturing sector we draw on Melitz (2003) who has 
shown that equilibrium under autarky can be characterized by two conditions, the free entry 
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( ,( P ϕ =  ) ) , ππ ϕ ⋅   is the ex-ante expected profit, which is equivalent to the profit level of the 
average surviving firm (with productivity level ϕ 
−
). FEC states that entry occurs until the 
value of entry,  ()
t
t 0 [1 ( ) ]
E vE f δπ ϕ
∞
= =− ⋅ e ∑ 
(* f
, is driven to zero. ZCPC states that the cutoff 
firm generates revenue  ) r ϕ σ = , which, by using  ()
1 () (* ) * rr
σ ϕϕ ϕ
− =  ϕ  and 
() rf π ϕσ =  − , implies the expression above. Melitz proves that (FEC) and (ZCPC) imply a 
unique solution for π  and  * ϕ  for a wide range of distribution functions  () g ϕ  that only have 
to satisfy some mild conditions. Once the equilibrium values of π  and  * ϕ  are obtained, the 
equilibrium mass of entrants 
E M  and of surviving firms M  can be derived as follows.  
The consumers' budget constraints imply that aggregate consumption expenditure for varieties 
L β  must equal the aggregate revenue of the surviving firms,  r M R ⋅ = , where the average 
revenue of surviving firms is given by  ( ) ( ) f r r + = = π σ ϕ K ~ . Moreover, market clearing in the 
A-sector commands that the value of consumption equals the value of production, 
() ( 11 tL ) L β γ −− = − , where γ  denotes the share of the workforce that is employed in 
manufacturing. Hence,  t γ β =+ , in our model. Combining these results it follows that 
() ( ) () M Lft βσ π γ π =+ = − L σ f +  and  ( ) 1( * )
E MMG δϕ =−.  
In order to obtain more specific results, we assume that firms draw their productivities from a 
Pareto-distribution, such that  () ( )
min 1
k




k , where 
 is the lower bound for productivity draws and   is the shape parameter.
3 Using this 
parameterization in (4), and assuming 
min 0 ϕ > k
1 k σ >+ , we find that average productivity is 
proportional to the cutoff productivity,  ()
1( σ 1 )
1
k
k σ ** ϕ ϕ = ϕ >
−
+−  . Furthermore, (FEC) and 
(ZCPC) are then given by  ( )
min k
e f ϕ
−  ( * πδ ϕ = )
k  and  ( )( ) (1 ) 1 fk π σσ = −+ − , 
                                                 
2 It can be shown that a welfare-maximizing government would not run a program where entry subsidies are 
financed through profit taxes for surviving firms. This is intuitive as profit taxes (conditional on survival) are 
anticipated by entrepreneurs and reduce the value of entry, which offsets the intention for entry subsidies. 
3 The Pareto distribution has been extensively used in the previous literature on heterogeneous firms (see 
Bernard et al., 2007; Helpman et al., 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Behrens et al. 2009).  respectively, which imply the following closed form solutions for the cutoff, mass of entrants, 








































Note that  ( ) ML r β ϕ =   and  ()
1 () * rf
σ ϕ ϕϕ σ
− = ⋅   also imply  () ()
1 * ML f
σ βσ ϕ ϕ
− =  . 
Using this in (4), and recalling that indirect utility is given by  () ln ln 1 Vy P ββ β = −+ − , we 















⎛⎞ ⎢⎥ =−⋅ ⋅ + − ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⋅ ⎝⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
) β    (6) 
Hence, countries with higher labour endowment L  and/or higher cutoff 
*
aut ϕ  are better off. 
 
2.6. Endogenous policy determination in the closed economy 


















⋅=⋅ =⋅ ⋅ → = ⋅ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ σ +
 (7) 
Eq. (7) implies that the subsidy which satisfies the government budget constraint is increasing 
and concave in the tax rate:   can only rise under-proportionally when taxes   are increased, 
as higher subsidies trigger further entry and thus reduce the subsidy per entrant. Furthermore, 
 always holds, hence subsidies do not cover the entire raw sunk costs of the 
entrepreneurs. The government in the closed economy chooses the subsidy   so as to 
maximize total welfare  . Using (5) and the relationship between the subsidy and 






aut aut V =⋅
  ()
{} 1
* 1l n ( )l n aut aut t Max W L t s t L b
β
σ βϕ − ⎡⎤ =− + ⋅ + ⋅+ ⎣⎦  , 
where  () ( 1 ln( ) 1 ln b ) f
β
σ β βρ βσ − ≡− + ⋅  is a constant. This problem gives rise to the 
following first order condition for a welfare maximum 
  , where 













= =⋅ ⋅  (8) 
Recall that marginal costs of taxation are constant and equal to one in our model. Condition 
(8) states that the optimal tax rate is set such that the marginal benefit of the last tax-€, in 
terms of the cutoff increase that it can generate by subsidizing entry, is also just equal to one. 
Hence, we can state:  
  9
 Proposition 1  Consider a government that subsidizes entry costs and finances the expenses 
through lump-sum taxes. Under autarky government sets the following entry subsidy and tax: 










=   (9) 














= ⎜ ⎜ +− − ⎝⎠



































.  Solving 
 yields the optimal tax  , which we substitute into (7) to obtain  . 
* * * ˆ 1 aut βϕ ⋅= aut t aut s  
 
An inspection of the subsidy-tax scheme yields several important insights: The government 
indeed has an incentive to subsidize entry as long as  0 > β . The optimal subsidy (and, hence, 
also the optimal tax) is inversely related to the elasticity of substitution, σ . Moreover, the 
optimal subsidy increases with size of the (unavoidable) raw entry cost,  e f . Due to the 
selection process that is operative in this model, this dependency gets mirrored in the negative 
dependency of the optimal tax on the shape parameter  . The intuition of these results is 
straightforward: the incentive to subsidize arises from the distortion induced by mark-up 
pricing in the manufacturing sector. The incentive to subsidize is, thus, positively related to 
the discrepancy between price and marginal cost, 
k
σ / 1 . The positive dependency of the 
subsidy on  e f  (and the negative dependency of the tax on  ) reflects the fact that entry 
subsidies are not the direct way to address the monopoly distortion. Rather, they indirectly 
target the distortion through the process of market entry.  
k
Before looking at this process in more detail, it is important to explore the optimal policy 
when the government disposes a full set of instruments. Suppose that government additionally 
has a consumption subsidy available. We can then show:  
Proposition 2  Consider a government that simultaneously disposes a lump-sum tax and two 
subsidy instruments, a consumption subsidy and an entry subsidy. Under autarky this 
government would choose a consumption subsidy  1 c s σ =  but no entry subsidy,  , and 
set the lump-sum tax 
0 s =
() 1 t βσ = − . This policy-scheme achieves the first-best allocation.  
Proof: We provide the technical derivation of this subsidy-tax scheme in appendix A. To 
prove that the allocation is then indeed first-best we refer to the fact that the static monopoly 
distortion is the only (net) distortion in our Dixit-Stiglitz model.
4     
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4 It is well-established that the Dixit-Stiglitz-model in addition exhibits a consumer surplus effect (an entering 
firm does not consider the extra consumer surplus it generates) and a profit destruction effect (an entering firm Proposition 2 thus tells us that a government would abstain from using a market entry subsidy 
if it had a full set of instruments available. As we have documented in our introduction the use 
of entry subsidies is highly pervasive in practise, however, whereas the first-best instrument 
of consumption subsidies are hardly used. We therefore believe that it is important to trace the 
effects of this relevant instrument of entry subsidies in this paper.  
This can be done by using eqs. (5) and (6). It is straightforward to see that the mass of entrants 
(
E
aut M ) is higher with the entry subsidy { } ** , aut aut tt ss ==  than without it { } 0 ts == . In 
principle, restoring the stationary equilibrium condition, 
E
in pM M δ ⋅ =⋅ , requires either a 
decrease of the survival probability in p , or an increase in the mass of firms in the market 
(which would imply higher firm turnover and lower average profits π ), or a combination of 
the two. It turns out that, with the Pareto-parameterization, the mass of active manufacturing 
firms  aut M  (and thus consumption variety) remains constant in the steady-state. The surviving 
firms become more productive on average ( *
aut ϕ  and  aut ϕ   increase), however. In other words, 
the entry subsidy does not lead to more but to better firms in the market by tightening 
selection. This higher average productivity implies that the aggregate physical output of 
manufacturing firms increases and that the CES price index   decreases. Consumption of 
manufacturing good is higher with 
aut P
{ } ** , aut ss = aut tt =  than with { } 0 ts = =  because the better 
manufacturing firms produce and sell more output at lower prices. 
 
3. The open economy 
We now explore the effects of market entry subsidies in an open economy setting with two 
countries   which may differ in population size   and technology. Regarding 
technology, we assume that entrants in country   draw from a country-specific Pareto-
distribution with common shape parameter k  but potentially different lower bounds, 





Firms in the two countries may face different effective sunk entry costs  , ei e i f fs =−   which are 
due to differences in the subsidy-tax schemes implemented by their respective governments. 
We shall ultimately be interested in the endogenous determination of these policy schemes 
where governments are assumed to maximize the welfare of their own citizens. We study 
these non-cooperative equilibria with symmetric and asymmetric countries in sections 4 and 
                                                                                                                                                         
does not consider the impact it has on profits of existing varieties) in addition to the classic monopoly distortion. 
However, these two additional distortions exactly offset each other, as Grossman and Helpman (1991, Appendix 
A 3.3) have shown in the context of a growth model. Baldwin (2005) has adapted this proof to the Melitz-model. 
An insightful discussion of the distortions in the Melitz-model from the perspective of a small open economy is 
provided by Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009). 
  11
5 Note that if H and F are identical in all respects, except for   , there is a first-order stochastic 
dominance of the productivity distribution in H, which would be the technologically leading country in the 




HF ϕϕ >5, respectively. In this section we start out to analyze the international equilibrium under the 
assumption that the policy parameters { } ,, , H HF F tstsare exogenous. 
There are both fixed and variable trade costs in the manufacturing sector. First, if a firm from 
country i decides (after learning its ϕ ) to become an exporter and to sell to country  j  it must 
pay an additional fixed cost  x f  on top of the fixed cost  f  that accrues irrespective of export 
status. Second, for one unit of output to arrive in  j  the firm in i must ship  1 τ >  units, where 
τ  denotes the variable iceberg trade costs. Trade in the numeraire sector   is costless, which 
ensures factor price equalization (FPE) provided both countries produce both types of goods. 
i A
 
3.1. Domestic and export cutoffs 
() () xjx j rf πϕ σ If a firm from country  j  sells to country  , its exporting profits are  i x ϕ =− . 
Clearly, there is a threshold level 
*
xj ϕ  such that this firm just breaks even abroad, i.e. 
( ) () * *
x xj i xj xj rr f ϕ ϕ τσ == . Similarly, for the domestic cutoff firm which just breaks even in 
its local market, we have  ()
*









 the following link 
between domestic and export cutoffs exists: ϕ ϕ = Λ⋅  where  ()
( ) 11 [] x ff
σ τ
− Λ≡ ⋅ . 
Throughout this paper we shall assume  x f f ≥
*
 which is a sufficient condition to ensure that 
. To solve for the domestic cutoffs  1 Λ> H ϕ  and  *
F ϕ  (which inter alia pin down the export 
cutoffs) we again make use of the (FEC) and the (ZCPC).
6 The (FEC) remains unchanged 
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ei i i i fs δϕ π
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As for the (ZCPC), ex-ante expected profits are now given by  ( ) ( ) ii i x i x i x i p π πϕ π ϕ =+ ⋅   
where  i ϕ   and  xi ϕ   are the average productivities among all active and, respectively, among 
the exporting firms from i. The exporting probability conditional on survival is given by 
() ( ** * )
kk *
xii x i == i j p ϕϕ ϕΛ ϕ . Using this together with  ()
1( 1 )
1 **




σ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ
−
+− ==  we can 
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− − ≡⋅  can be understood as a measure of trade freeness which is higher, 
the lower the variable or fixed trade costs are. Note that 01 φ < <  due to  x f f > .  
                                                 
6 See Demidova (2008) for a lucid exposition of the cutoff determination with asymmetric countries, where 
(FEC) and (ZCPC) are interdependent. Compared to that paper we consider further asymmetries across countries 
(size and effective entry costs) but work with a specific functional form for the productivity distribution. Substituting (ZCPC) into (FEC) for countries  { } ,, ij HF = we obtain a system of equations, 
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(10) 
() () eH eF f s f s ζ ≡− − and  (
min min k
FH χϕϕ ≡ )  respectively measure the countries’ relative 
effective entry costs and relative technology. Note that the cutoff expressions in (10) converge 
against the autarky cutoff levels given in (5) if exporting becomes prohibitively costly (i.e., if 
0 φ → ). If countries are symmetric ( 1 ς χ = =
()
) we can verify the selection effect of opening 
up to trade by noting that 
1
,,
** 1 i i aut i aut ϕφ ϕ ϕ =+ > * k . That is, trade integration per se raises 
the average productivity in the two symmetric countries by forcing less efficient firms to exit 
and by reallocating market shares towards more efficient producers. 
In the asymmetric case, assuming that  is the laggard country in terms of effective entry 
costs and/or technology, we have 
F
1 ς ≤  and  1 χ ≤ . We then need to impose the condition that 
these asymmetries are modest relative to the trade openness, namely ς χφ ⋅ > , to ensure that 
 for  . In this case we obtain  * 0 i ϕ > , iH F = *** *
xFx HHF ϕ ϕϕ ϕ >> > . The firms from the country 
with better technology and/or lower effective entry costs have higher average productivity.
7  
 
3.2. Trade balance condition and equilibrium allocation 
To complete the description of the open economy equilibrium we first need to derive the 
allocation of labour  i γ  in both countries. We use the aggregate trade balance for country H : 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 H xH xH xH F xF xF xF H H H H M pr Mpr t L L ϕϕ β =+ − − − −  γ  (11) 
The LHS of (11) denotes the value of country H ’s manufacturing exports, and the first term 
on the RHS are the respective manufacturing imports from country  . If manufacturing trade 
is not balanced between 
F
H  and  , the overall trade balance is closed by net exports of the 
numeraire good (the sum of the second and third term on the RHS). Using this trade balance 
condition we can state the following result which is proven in appendix B:  
F
                                                 
7 Assume  1 ς =  and  1 φ χ << . Note that (10) then implies  * 0 H ϕ φ ∂ ∂> while the sign of  *
F ϕ φ ∂∂  is positive 
(negative) if χ  is above (below)  (
  13
)
2 21 φ φ + . That is, trade integration clearly raises the cutoff and average 
productivity of the technologically leading country, while the laggard country only gains from trade integration 
if it only modestly backwards. Demidova (2008) proves this result for general distribution functions  () g ϕ .  
Lemma 1  In the open economy equilibrium the labour share allocated to manufacturing 
production in country  is given by     , iH F =







=+ + ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠







φςχ λ ςχ φ
⎛⎞
= − ⎜ ⎜ −− ⎝⎠
+ ⎟ ⎟  (12) 
where  FH LL λ ≡  denotes relative country size.  
 
Note that a higher tax rate in country   increases the manufacturing share in that country, as 
numeraire consumption is squeezed and entry costs are lowered. Furthermore, recall that due 
to identical preferences across countries the per-capita manufacturing expenditure of every 
household is given by 
i
β . It immediately follows from (12) that  HF t γ γβ = =+  if countries 
are symmetrical ( 1 λ ςχ = == ), and  i ti γ β = +  if trade costs are prohibitive ( 0 φ → ). To 
ensure that the numeraire sector is active after trade in both countries in the asymmetric case 
we need to impose parameter restrictions such that 0 1 i γ < <  for  , iH F = . These conditions, 
spelled out in appendix B, require that the degree of asymmetry is modest relative to trade 
openness, and that the per-capita manufacturing expenditure β  is sufficiently small. Under 
these conditions, the country that is larger and/or technologically leading and/or has lower 
effective entry costs produces the bulk of varieties and has a trade surplus in that sector.  
Using  H γ  and  F γ  as given in (12), it is straightforward to derive the equilibrium masses of 
entrants 
E
i M , surviving firms  i M  and exporters  xi M , and the available consumption variety 
( ti i xj M MM =+ ) for both countries. Finally, the CES price index is 
( ) ()
11
it i t PM
σ
i ρ ϕ
− =⋅  , 
where  ti ϕ 
i
 denotes the average productivity among all (domestic and foreign) firms active in 





* i i t rf ϕ ϕϕ σ
−
=  , this leads to the following expression for total welfare in i: 
    [] () ( )
1
1
* ln 1 ln ln ii i i i i i i WL y P bL t L b σ ββ ϕ −
⎡ ⎤ =− ⋅ + = − + ⋅ + ⋅+
⎣ ⎦
 (13)     
Taking eqs. (10), (13) and the conditions for non-specialization, we show in appendix B that 
the leading country in terms of technology or size has more entrants, more surviving firms, 
higher consumption diversity, lower CES price index and higher welfare.  
When it comes to effective entry costs the welfare implications of country differences are not 
obvious, because lower effective entry costs require higher taxes to finance the subsidies. 
Before turning to the endogenous determination of the subsidy-tax schedule it is useful, 
however, to briefly consider how an exogenous change in these costs affects the steady-state 
equilibrium of the open economy model while neglecting the implied changes in tax rates. 
  14Recall that in the autarky case a decrease of sunk entry cost leads to an increase in the mass of 
entrants and the cutoff productivity, while ex-ante expected profits and the mass of surviving 
firms remain constant (see section 2). In the open economy matters are more complex. 
Suppose that effective entry costs in country   decrease, which implies an increase of the 
term 
F
ς . It follows from (10) and the expressions reported in appendix B that we not only have 
more entrants 
E
F M  and higher threshold productivity  *
F ϕ  in country  , but also a rise in the 
mass of surviving firms 
F
F M . In contrast, steady-state values of 
E
H M ,  *
H ϕ  and   H M  are 
decreasing in ς . The reason is the following: The lower effective entry costs trigger entry and 




F ϕ  now also implies a rising export cutoff  *
xH ϕ . It becomes more difficult for 
firms from H  to break into the more competitive market in  . This puts downward pressure 
on expected profits 
F
H π  and reduces the incentive for entry (
E
H M  decreases). The stationary 
equilibrium in H  is restored by a combination of higher survival probability (lower  *
H ϕ ) and 
lower firm turnover  H M . This in turn facilitates entry of firms from   into their export 
market (decrease of 
F
*
xF ϕ ), which further boosts ex-ante expected profits  F π . Restoring the 
stationary equilibrium in  now implies a combination of tougher selection and higher firm 
turnover. Put differently, country  ’s entry cost reduction induces a selection effect in   





H .  
 
4. Taxes and entry subsidies: Symmetrical open economies 
We now turn to the determination of the endogenous entry subsidies. The analysis in this 
section assumes that countries H  and   are symmetrical in terms of size and technology, 
which allows for closed-form solutions for the (equilibrium and optimal) policies. First we 
deal with the Nash-equilibrium that results when 
F
H  and   behave non-cooperatively 
(section 4.1) before addressing the case where 
F
H  and  cooperate (section 4.2). In section 
4.3 we compare the policies and discuss the economic intuition. 
F
 
4.1. Nash equilibrium policy 
The government in country   maximizes total welfare   as given in (13) with respect to the 




} , j j ts as given. Similar as under autarky the first order condition commands 
that (constant) marginal costs of taxation equal marginal benefits 
  15   ˆ *1 i β ϕ ⋅= , where   









d s ϕ ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
= =⋅ ⋅ . (14) 
In the case of symmetrical technologies ( 1 χ =  and 
min min 1 HF ϕϕ = =  for convenience) the cutoff 
productivity * i ϕ  from (10) simplifies to  





















Furthermore, using  1 λ =  ( ) and the expressions for  HF LL == L
E
i M  as given in eq. (B5) in 
appendix B, the government budget constraint reads as  




ii i i i j i e i j
L






⋅=⋅ =⋅ − + − +  ,  (16) 
for  { } ,, ij HF = ,   where  i ≠ j ( )( ) (1 ) (1 ) eH F eF H f ss f ss ξφ φ φ φ ≡− − + − − +. This budget 
constraint (16) can be expressed as an implicit function  ( )( , 0 i ij ss) ,,
E
i i ij i i i gtss t L s M = −= .  
Postulating non-cooperative government behaviour we can solve for the Nash equilibrium in 
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∂∂ −  ⋅ ,      
where the term  i ξ    for   { } ,, , ij HF i j =≠  is given by  () ( )
22 2 22 4 ji j i j i j i ss s s s s s φφ φ ξ +− + + =   
() () () () ( )
2 22 2 4
21 ( 1 ) 2 1 ( 1 ) 4 1 ej i e j e
2 32 2
i j i f ss f s s s f φ φ −− − + − + − − + −− +− s φφ φ φ φ φ φ φ .  
Using these expressions in the first order condition (14) yields  ( ) ˆ *, ii j ss ϕ , which leads to the 
government reaction functions  ( ) ˆ *, 1 0 ii j ss βϕ ⋅− =  for the two countries. In the present case 
with equally large and productive countries ( 1 λ χ = = ) it is clear that these reaction functions 
are symmetric, and that the Nash equilibrium subsidy must be identical in the two countries 
( ). Exploiting this symmetry property we can state  ** HF sss == *
 
Proposition 3 Consider two symmetrical open economies. The government in each country 
collects income taxes and subsidizes sunk entry costs for domestic firms. The tax rate and the 
entry subsidy in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium are given by  


























.  (17) 



























  16Hence, marginal benefits of entry subsidization in the symmetrical open economy case read as  
















0 .  (18) 
Note that (18) implies positive but decreasing marginal benefits of entry subsidization, 
() ˆ* s βϕ ∂⋅ ∂ < 0  with  () ( ) ˆ*1 0 0 ee fsf βϕ σ σ ⋅→ − − >  if φ →  and  ˆ*0 β ϕ ⋅→  if  1 φ → . 
Solving ˆ*1 β ϕ ⋅=  yields the Nash equilibrium subsidy   as given in (17). Furthermore, with 
symmetrical countries the budget constraint (16) simplifies to 
* s
() [1 e sk t f σβ σ =−
* t
] + k t σ . 
Plugging in   and solving for   then yields the equilibrium tax rate   as given in (17).  * s t  
 
4.2. Cooperative entry subsidization policy 
Turning to the case where the governments in H  and   cooperate, recall that marginal utility 
of income is equal to one everywhere due to quasi-linear preferences. A utilitarian social 
welfare function thus precisely measures joint welfare, which in the case with two 
symmetrical, non-specialized countries can be written as 
F
    () ()
** 1l n 1l n HF H H F F WWL t t b βϕ βϕ ⎡ ⎤ ′ Ω= + = − + ⋅ + − + ⋅ + ⎣ ⎦, (19) 
where 
2
1 2l n bb L
β
σ− ′ ≡+  is a constant. This objective function (19) is maximized while taking 
into account the overall budget constraint of the two countries,  
() ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 ,, 0
EE E E
H F HHH F FFH F F HH FF H L gL t t s M ss s M ss t s M s M t =+ − − = ↔ = ⋅ + ⋅ −  (20) 
Substituting (20) into (19) we can express joint welfare Ω solely as a function of   and  ,  H s F s
( , ) H F ss Ω . Taking first-order conditions, and imposing symmetry   after taking 
derivatives, we can characterize the cooperative entry subsidization policy as follows: 
HF ss == s
 
Proposition 4   Consider two symmetrical open economies where governments cooperatively 
set entry subsidies and finance the expenses with lump-sum taxes. The cooperative policy is 
equivalent to the tax and entry subsidy under autarky characterized in eq. (9). 
Proof:   Differentiating  i dd s Ω  and imposing  ij sss = =  for  { } ,, ij HF = ,   yields  i ≠ j
() ( )
2 0 ee dd s L f s k fs βσ σ Ω= − −= . Solving this first-order condition we obtain  e sf σ =  
which is equivalent to  . Using  *
aut s HF ttt = =  and  HF ss e s f σ = ==  in (20) we obtain 
() 20 k gL t
β
σ =− = , hence tk β σ =  which is equivalent to  .  *
aut t  
 
If the two symmetrical countries coordinate their policies, they behave as a single country 
under autarky in our framework and indirectly correct for the monopoly distortion in the 
  17manufacturing sector by subsidizing firm entry. Again it should be noted that this cooperative 
choice of entry subsidies is only a constrained optimum.
8 
 
4.3 Entry subsidies: Nash equilibrium versus cooperative policy  
Using propositions 1, 3 and 4 we can now single out some important observations about the 
Nash-equilibrium and the cooperative entry subsidization policy for the case of two 
symmetrical open economies in the course of trade integration. These insights, which follow 
directly from (9) and (17), can be summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 5  a) The entry subsidy and the tax in the Nash-equilibrium are hump-shaped 
with respect to trade openness. Specifically, we have { ,  } and thus over-
subsidization for low, and { , 
* *
aut ss > * *
aut tt >
* *
aut ss < * *
aut tt < } and thus under-subsidization for high levels of 
trade openness φ , with {t ,  } at  * *
aut t = * s *
aut s = ( ) 2 φ σσ =− . 
b) With prohibitively high trade costs the Nash-equilibrium coincides with the autarkic 
(=coordinated) policy, i.e.,   and  * * aut ss = * * aut tt =  for  0 φ = . 
c) With free trade the Nash-equilibrium policy implies a tax rate of zero and no entry 
subsidies (  and   at  *0 s = *0 t = 1 φ = ). 
Figure 1 illustrates the tax and entry subsidy in the open economy Nash-equilibrium (thick 
solid lines), and with cooperative policy determination (broken lines).  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The figures show that, starting from an autarkic situation, gradual trade liberalization first 
leads to increasing taxes and entry subsidies in the Nash-equilibrium. Then, at a certain stage 
of openness, taxes and entry subsidies start to decrease with further integration until they 
eventually fall short of the cooperative levels and ultimately converge to zero when trade 
becomes completely free.  
What is the intuition for these results? In the open economy there are two motives for 
governments to subsidize firm entry. First, this policy tool indirectly corrects for the 
distortions due to imperfect competition in the manufacturing industry. Second, the cross-
country transmission of the effects makes entry subsidies a strategic policy tool. The 
cooperative solution internalizes all cross-country externalities and thereby only follows the 
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8 Similarly as under autarky, the first-best allocation can only be achieved with direct consumption subsidies. We 
show in appendix C that, if consumption subsidies were available, the cooperative solution commands such a 
subsidy at the rate 1/σ  as under autarky. Moreover, we also show that the non-cooperative choice and the 
cooperative choice of consumption subsidies coincide. This parallels the result by Haufler and Pflüger (2004) for 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model without firm heterogeneity.  first motivation. Proposition 4 shows that this cooperative policy is equivalent to the tax and 
entry subsidy in the autarky case, and is therefore independent of the level of trade openness. 
Any deviation of the Nash-equilibrium from the cooperative policy in the range of φ  
therefore represents the effect of trade integration on the strategic motives for entry 
subsidization. Proposition 5 shows that the net externality exerted by the non-cooperative 
choice of policy schemes is ambiguous since there are two competing effects.  
To understand the non-monotonic effect of trade liberalization on the Nash-equilibrium, it is 
useful to study the marginal benefits of entry subsidization ( ˆ* β ϕ ⋅ ) in greater detail. If freer 
trade increases (decreases)  ˆ* β ϕ ⋅ , this would push for an increase (a decrease) of   and  , 
since the marginal costs of taxation are constant. Differentiating (18) with respect to 
* t * s
φ , 
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 (21)   
The overall sign of (21) is ambiguous. On the one hand we find that an additional € worth of 
subsidies generates a more substantial increase of the cutoff productivity the freer trade is 
( ()
2 * dd s d ϕφ > 0 ). This higher effectiveness of the subsidy is represented by the positive 
first term in (21), which is increasing in φ . On the other hand, it becomes increasingly more 
difficult to finance an additional € worth of subsidies by raising taxes in the open economy 
Nash-equilibrium, as the mass of entrants becomes extremely responsive to the entry 
subsidies in the two countries if openness is high. This is represented by the negative second 
term ( ()
2 0 ds d t d φ < ) which is decreasing in φ . When taken together, the overall sign of 
() ˆ* dd β ϕφ ⋅  at   is positive at low, and negative at high levels of  * ss = φ . In other words, 
gradual trade integration first amplifies the marginal benefits of subsidization and leads to a 
higher tax and subsidy in the Nash equilibrium as the former effect dominates the latter. Later 
on, their relative strength switches and further trade integration decreases the marginal 
benefits of entry subsidies, and thus the size of the subsidy programme. 
Turning to observation b) of proposition 5, this result immediately follows from the fact that 
there is no incentive for strategic entry subsidization if trade costs are prohibitively high 
( 0 φ = ). There is still the non-strategic motive for subsidies, which the governments take into 
account and behave as under autarky. Finally, turning to observation c), there is no motive for 
further entry subsidization in the Nash-equilibrium if trade is completely free. In this 
constellation all firms in this economy are already exporters, so that there are no further 




5. Asymmetric open economies 
In this section we turn to the Nash equilibrium in the case of two asymmetric countries that 
can differ in technology or size. Allowing for asymmetries unfortunately rules out analytical 
solutions for the equilibrium entry subsidy and tax. However, it is possible to derive explicit 
expressions for the government reaction functions and to solve for the Nash-equilibrium 
numerically. First, using (10) we obtain the following expressions for the marginal 
productivity gain associated with the entry subsidy in countries H and F, respectively. 
 
























Suppose that F is the technologically laggard country ( 1 χ < ). Equation (22) reveals that if χ  
increases and country F catches up, every € worth of entry subsidies generates a more 
substantial cutoff increase in that country, ceteris paribus, while the entry subsidies in the 
other country H become less effective. The budget constraints can be written as follows 
 
() ( ) () ()
() () () ()
2
2
ˆ 1( 2 1 2
ˆ 12 0
HH H e F e H H H
FF F e H e F F F
gs L f s f s t L
gs L f s f s t L
ξχ φ λφ λ χ
ξχ φ φ
⋅⎡⎤ =− + − − − − ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ =⋅ ⋅ − + − − − = ⎣⎦
0 =
 (23)   
where  ( )
() () () ( ( ) )
1 ˆ







−− − − − −
, which can be used to derive 
()
1
ii ii ds dt g s
− =− ∂ ∂  for  { } , iH F = .  
Substituting this together with (22) into the first-order condition (14) we obtain the 
government reaction functions for countries H and F, which depend on relative technology 
and country sizes,  () ( ) ˆ ,,, * ,,, 10 iij i ij RF s s s s χλ βϕ χλ = ⋅− = {  for  } ,, , ij HF j ì =≠ . As 
stated before, we cannot solve this equation system explicitly for closed-form solutions 
 which satisfy   and  . However, we can provide some intuition on the 
effects of technology and size differences by means of numerical examples.  
*, * HF ss 0 i RF = * 0 i s ≥
In table 1 we illustrate the Nash equilibrium subsidies in various constellations. The left half 
of the table refers to cases where country H  is technologically ahead of  , whereas the right  F
                                                 
9 By the definition of φ , at maximum openness  1 φ =  we have 
()()
() 1 1 k k
x LHS RHS ff
σ σ τ
+− −
≡≡ = . Since 
1 τ ≥ ,   x f f ≥  and  1 k
  20
1 σ −> > it follows that   and  1 LHS ≥ 1 RHS ≤ . The only consistent constellation is 
therefore  , i.e.,  1 LHS R = HS = 1 τ =  and  x f f = . In other words, in a constellation with maximum openness 
( 1 φ = ) all firms in this symmetrical two-country economy are exporters ( 1
k
x
− p = = Λ ). half refers to cases where H  is larger than  . In the first line on both halves we still report 
the benchmark cases with identical countries. In the second and third line we consider cases 
with a disparity (in technology or, respectively, in size) between countries 
F
H  and  , where 
the magnitude of the disparity is stronger in the third than in the second line. For each 
constellation of the country disparity we then report the Nash-equilibrium subsidy that would 
result with low, medium and high trade openness, respectively.
10 
F
 [TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 yields three main insights. Firstly, the technologically leading country H  has a lower 
equilibrium entry subsidy than the laggard country  . This can be seen by comparing    
and    in the left half of the table for any given constellation of trade openness and strength 
of the technological gap. This result is quite intuitive. In country H entrants draw from a more 
favorable distribution and, thus, have a higher ex-ante probability to succeed in the market 
than in country F. Put differently, surviving firms in H are on average more productive and 
successful as exporters than firms from country F. This implies that there is less need in 





Secondly, the examples in the right half of table 1 suggest that subsidies are also lower in 
larger countries. What is the intuition for this result? Recall from above that, neglecting entry 
subsidies, there are more entrants, more surviving firms and higher consumption diversity in 
larger countries. Due to these market size effects, country H is therefore relatively less 
affected by the exporting firms from country F than vice versa. It is therefore less inclined to 
raise taxes in order to subsidize further entry of domestic firms and to gain competitiveness 
relative to the (few) firms from the small country. 
Thirdly and finally, the examples suggest that there is still a hump-shaped relationship 
between subsidies and trade openness, similarly as in the case with symmetrical countries. For 
any given (technological or size) disparity we find that the subsidy in both countries first 
increases and then decreases as trade gradually becomes freer. These numerical results for the 
Nash-equilibrium verify the hump-shaped pattern shown in figure 1.  
6. Empirical analysis 
Our theoretical model thus predicts a U-shaped relationship between trade openness and 
effective entry costs  * ee * f fs =−  . In this final section we provide a brief empirical analysis 
whether these theoretical results are supported by the data.  
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10 For the sake of numerical simulation we assume fixed values for the parameters f and fx in all examples. 
Different levels of trade openness φ  thus result from different levels of iceberg trade costs τ. Furthermore, in 
table 1 we focus on the equilibrium subsidies and neglect the corresponding tax rates that satisfy the balanced 
budget constraint. In the examples the tax rate follows a similar pattern as the subsidies. 6.1 Data and estimation 
Djankov et al. (2002) have compiled data on effective entry costs for 85 countries in the year 
1999 that include both pecuniary and time costs for obtaining all necessary permits and 
complying with all other relevant official requests to set up a firm. This data does not directly 
include government subsidies to entrepreneurs, such as start-up grants etc., but focuses on the 
legal procedures that are officially required for starting a business. However, we hypothesize 
that countries with stiffer entry regulation and higher effective entry costs are also less prone 
to paying direct pecuniary subsidies. We therefore use this measure by Djankov et al. (2002) 
as our proxy for the variable  * e f   which ranges from 2.5% of Canadian GDP per capita (483 
$) to 495% of GDP per capita (945 $) in the Dominican Republic.
11 
We augment this data set with information on trade openness at the country level, sticking to 
some standard proxies that have been widely used in the literature. The most common 
openness indicator is trade intensity which is defined for country i as the sum of total exports 
and imports over GDP,  () ii i TI Exp Imp GDP =+ i . Squalli and Wilson (2006) have criticized 
this conventional approach because it typically classifies some of the most important trading 
nations (such as USA or Germany) as relatively closed economies. They suggest an 
alternative “composite trade intensity” ( ), which corrects the standard TI  for the 
importance of a country to overall world trade. The CT  is defined as follows 
CTI
I















where   is the number of countries. Squalli and Wilson (2006) provide TI - and CT -based 
openness levels for 136 different countries and for the year 2000. Matching this information 
with the entry cost data by Djankov et al. (2002), we end up with a sample of 81 countries. To 
be consistent with the theoretical model we furthermore include population size and 
“technology” of these countries in the empirical analysis. The latter is proxied by 
GDP/employment (in $ for 1999). The main estimation equation is given by 
n I
  ( )
2
,1 2 3 4 ei i i i i i i f OPEN OPEN GDP empl Population α ββ β β =+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +  ε , (25) 
where   is the TI - or  -based openness measure for country  , and  i OPEN CTI i i ε  is an error 
term. We estimate this cross-sectional equation by using OLS with robust standard errors.
12  
 
                                                 
11 The absolute effective entry costs range from 42.38$ in Mongolia (12% of GDP per capita) to 10,928.18$ in 
Austria (42% of GDP per capita). As in Djankov et al. (2002) we measure effective entry costs relative to the 
countries’ income level in the empirical analysis. 
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12 In appendix D we provide additional information about the data including a list of the 81 countries.  6.2 Results and discussion 
In table 2 we report the results. The left half of the table refers to “unconditional” estimations 
where we only control for trade openness while in the right half we condition our estimates on 
population size and labor productivity. In columns 1 and 3 we have used the CT -measure of 
trade openness, while columns 2 and 4 refer to the more conventional TI -measure.  
I
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Consistently across all specifications we find that  1 β  is negative and highly statistically 
significant while  2 β  is significantly positive. That is, both unconditionally and conditional on 
size and technology we do in fact find a U-shaped relationship between trade openness and 
effective entry costs, as predicted by our theoretical model.  
These estimation results should be taken with a grain of salt. First and foremost, effective 
entry costs are likely to be measured with error (see Djankov et al. 2002 for an in-depth 
discussion) and do not directly reflect the entry subsidies which are the main focus of our 
model. Second, trade openness data refer to export intensities rather than exogenous transport 
costs. Finally, there may be issues of endogeneity as the decisions of foreign firms to enter a 
domestic market (and, thus, the openness level of the domestic country) are likely to be 
affected by the entry regulation that is adopted in this economy. Inherent data problems of 
measuring subsidies, effective entry costs, and trade openness more accurately across 
countries prevent us from a more detailed analysis at this stage. We still believe that our 
simple empirical analysis leads to some useful insights. In particular we conclude that the one 
main result of our theoretical model is consistent with the stylized facts about effective entry 
costs in open economies that appear in the data.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have a developed a two-country model where governments engage in entry 
subsidization of domestic firms. One motive for this policy, valid already in an autarkic 
scenario, is to indirectly correct the distortions that result from imperfect competition. In open 
economies there is then also a second, strategic motive for entry subsidies, namely to tighten 
selection in the own country which improves the average productivity of domestic firms and 
makes market entry for foreign firms more difficult. Put differently, even though entry 
subsidies have – at first glance – no direct implications for exporting decisions of domestic or 
foreign firms as they do not affect fixed or variable trade costs directly, there are still distinct 
general equilibrium implications for market entry considerations and exporting probabilities. 
This can render entry subsidies an interesting strategic policy tool for governments, because 
  23entry regulation for new firms is typically conceived as a purely domestic policy area. Unlike 
some of the classical tools of trade policy, such as export subsidies or import tariffs, these 
entry subsidies are typically not scrutinized by international organizations like the WTO. Our 
analysis shows that due to general equilibrium interactions there are, however, distinct cross-
country transmissions of this “domestic” policy and potential gains from policy cooperation. 
Our model predicts a U-shaped relationship between trade openness and effective entry costs 
in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. If trade openness is low, trade integration first leads 
to higher entry subsidies and thus to lower effective entry costs. Later on, at higher levels of 
openness, integration leads to less subsidization. This U-shaped pattern also shows up in 
cross-country data. To set our findings into perspective, let us refer to specification 4 of table 
1 which uses the more easily interpretable trade intensity (TI )-based openness measure. 
Conditional on size and technology differences we find that effective entry costs achieve a 
global minimum at a quite high openness level equal to ( ) 184.4 % Exp Imp GDP += . Only 3 
out of 81 countries exhibit TI -based openness beyond this critical level (Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia). The remaining 78 countries, which include all OECD members, are 
actually located in the downward-sloping range of the U-shaped relationship. These numbers 
suggest that further trade integration may put downward pressure on effective entry costs for 
the majority of countries. In terms of our model this would imply that most countries – being 
exposed to further trade integration – may actually increase their efforts to engage in strategic 
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 Appendix A: Consumption subsidies under autarky 
Preliminaries: Consider ad-valorem subsidies to consumption of manufacturing varieties. The 
consumer price of a variety produced by a firm with productivity level ϕ  is now 
() ( ) () ( ) 11 cc c ps p s ϕ ϕ =− ⋅ =− ρ ϕ . Total revenue and profits for that firm are then given by 
() ()() ( ) ( )
1
1 c rp q L s P
σ σ
ϕϕ ϕ β ρ ϕ
−−
== −  and  ( ) ( ) r f πϕ ϕ σ = − , with CES price level  
  ()
( ) ()
11 1 c Ps M
σ ρϕ
− =− ⋅  ,      (A1) 
where average productivityϕ   is defined as in (4). The (FEC) does not change compared to 
the case without consumption subsidy. The (ZCPC) does not change either, since 







+− ==   remain constant. Hence, the consumption subsidy 
does not affect π  and  * ϕ  compared to the benchmark case. We still have 
  ()
() ( )











= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +− − ⎝⎠












Consumption subsidies do, however, affect the equilibrium mass of entrants and surviving 
firms. Using (A1) in  () ( ) ( )
1




==−   yields  () () 1 c M Ls β =− r . With 
(A2) and the stationarity condition  ( ) ( ) 1*
E GM φδ M − =⋅  we then find that both M  and 























= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⋅
− − ⎝⎠
 (A3) 
Proof of proposition 2: We can now prove proposition 2. With two instruments, consumption 
subsidies   and entry subsidies  , the government budget constraint is given by  c s s
E M c tL s s Mr ⋅=⋅ +⋅ ⋅. Using (A2), (A3) and  ( ) 1 c M rLs β ⋅ =−  this can be rewritten as 















Government maximizes welfare, which using  () () (
1
11 11 c Ps L f
σ
σσ ) * β σρ −− =− ϕ  reads as 
() ( ) () () () () 11 1l n ( ) l n 1 1l n * l n 1 l n c WL t P L t s Lb
βσ β
σσ ββ β β ϕ
−−
⎡ ⎤ =− − ⋅ + − =− + ⋅ −⋅− + ⋅ + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.  
Using (A2) and (A4), and taking first-order conditions with respect to   and  , we obtain  s c s
( ) ( ) ( )







kf s s k ks dW
ds ks f s
βσ σ σσ σ
σσ
−− ++ − −
==
−− −






ff s s s s dW







The solution to this equation system is  1 c s σ =  and  0 s = , as stated in proposition 2. 
Substituting this into (A4) then yields the corresponding tax rate  () 1 t βσ = − . Note that 
consumer prices are now given by  1 () ( 1 ) c p σ 1 ϕ = ρϕ ϕ −= . Hence, consumers pay prices 
equal to marginal costs. As there are no further (net) distortions except for the monopolistic 
mark-up pricing (see above), this policy where government subsidizes manufacturing 
consumption instead of firm entry, thus, achieves the first-best allocation.   
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 Appendix B: The open economy equilibrium 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: We have  ii i i ii LM r t L γ =⋅ +, where  ( )( ii i x i x i x i rr p r ) ϕ ϕ =+  , which states 
that aggregate earnings in manufacturing come from government spending and the revenue of 
manufacturing firms. Hence,  () ii i i i M tLr γ =−  for  , iH F = . Substituting these terms into 
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ϕ ϕφ ϕ φ φ ζ χ ϕ
−
− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞⎛⎞ −




















σ ϕ τ ϕϕ ϕ φ ζ χ
ϕ ϕφ ϕ φ ζ χ ϕ
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− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞⎛⎞ −




Solving (B1) for  i γ  yields  


























+  (B2) 
Plugging in the expressions for  H b  and  H b  then yields  H γ  and  F γ  as given in lemma 1.   
Parameter restrictions to ensure 0<γi<1 for i=H,F: We firstly impose restrictions to ensure 
that 0 1 ii i t β γ <≡− <  for  . Assuming without loss of generality that country   lags 
behind country 
, iH F = F
H  in terms of size and/or effective sunk entry costs and/or technology, we 
























If the conditions in (B3) hold we have 0 1 FH β β < << , with  0 H β ι ∂ ∂<  and  0 F β ι ∂∂ >  for 
{ } ,, ι λςχ =  and  0 H β φ ∂∂ > ,  0 H β φ ∂∂ < . We then need to assume  i t i γ <  and 
FH H F tt γ γ −< − so that results for  i β  carry over to  i γ . In words, (B3) requires that country 
asymmetries are small relative to trade openness, and that per-capita manufacturing 
expenditure  β  and tax rates   are sufficiently small. Under these conditions the leading 
country 
i t
H  is specialized in manufacturing, and trade integration reinforces this pattern. 
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The mass of firms active in country i  ti i xj M MM =+ (i.e., consumption variety) is then 
readily obtained. From these expressions it follows that 
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as  01 λ <≤ ,  01 χ <≤ ,  01 ς <≤ ,  ,  0 HF LL ≥> ( ) ( ) 0 eH eF f sf s <−≤− and   
imply 
0 x ff >>
() ( 1 ) ζχφ φ ζ χ −> −  and  ( ) ( ) ( 1 )
22 1( 1 ) ( ) λζχ φ λ φζ +− χ λ ζχ λ φ φ +> + − λ +. That is, 
the leading country has more entrants, surviving firms and consumption variety. As the 
leading cutoff productivity is also higher (or at most equal) in the leading country welfare 
must therefore be higher. 
 
Symmetrical open economy case: With  1 λ ςχ = ==  , eqs. (B4)-(B6) simplify to the 





























































These expressions show that the move from autarky to trade among symmetrical countries 
causes exit of domestic firms but per se does not affect the mass of entrants under the Pareto-
distribution. Our assumption  x f f >  implies that the move from autarky to trade causes a 
reduction of consumption diversity with symmetrical countries (also see Baldwin 2005 on 
this). However, the introduction of trade still implies a welfare gain for both countries as 
* * aut ϕ ϕ >  in the symmetrical case.  
 
 
  28Appendix C: Consumption subsidies in the open economy 
 
Preliminaries: Consider ad-valorem subsidies to consumption of manufacturing varieties, 
where domestic and imported varieties are subsidized with the same rate   in country  . The 
aggregate value of manufacturing consumption in country i can be written as 
. In equilibrium we must have 
ci s i
() ( i i i i j xj xj xj CM r Mpr ϕ ≡⋅ +⋅⋅  ) ϕ  ( ) 1 ci Ls β =− i i C . The 
government budget constraint,   thus implies   ii tL= c ii sC
   ( ) ( ) 1 ic i ts s β =⋅ − c i    (C1)   
Furthermore, the CES price level in the open economy is  ( ) ( ) ()
11 1 ic i ti ti Ps M
σ ρ ϕ
− =− ⋅  . 
Taking into account that  () () ()
1
1 i i ti ci ti rs P
σ σ
i L ϕ ρϕ β
− − =− 
( ) )
, and substituting in   we thus 
have 
i P
() ( 1 ti i ci i ti s r
σ
ϕ ⋅  ML β =− . Using the replacement  ()() rf
1 * it i t ii
σ ϕ ϕϕ
− =  σ , we can 
then write  () () ( )
1 * 1 ti ci i ti i MsL f
σ σ βσ ϕ ϕ



















=− ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟ ⋅ ⎝⎠
   (C2) 
Note that cutoffs  *
i ϕ  are not affected by consumption subsidies as (FEC) and (ZCPC) do not 
change. The cutoffs are given as in (10) with  ee f f =   since we neglect entry subsidies in this 
appendix.  
Optimal consumption subsidy: Welfare in country i is  () [1 ln ln 1 ] ii i i WL t P ββ β = −− + −
ci s
. 








ci ci i ci ci ci
dW dt dP




=− − =− + =
−− −
 (C3) 
Solving (C3) immediately leads to  1 ci s σ = . Furthermore, the consumption subsidy of the 
other country,  , does not affect welfare in country  . There is thus no difference between 
the Nash- and the cooperative consumption subsidy in this two-region economy. Hence, this 
policy scheme of subsidizing manufacturing consumption is equivalent to the autarky case 
and leads again to the first-best allocation. 
cj s i
 
  29Appendix D: Data 
List of countries included in the empirical analysis (N=81): Argentina, Armenia , Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., 
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Rep, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 





, ei      Cost+time measure provided in Djankov et al. (2002), Table III, measured as   
   % of country GDP per capita in US-$ for 1999. We lose 4 observations (Mali, 
     Mongolia, Taiwan and Vietnam) due to a lack of trade openness data 
 
i OPEN   Squalli and Wilson (2006), Table 2. CTI- and TI-based trade openness   
   measures for the year 2000 using Penn World Tables data 
 
Populationi  Total population size (in 1,000) for 1999, World Bank, World Development 
Indicators  
 
Employmenti  Total employment level for 1999 (in 1,000), International Labour Office (ILO), 
LABORSTA – data base for labour statistics F
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